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Due to the intrinsic product-specific sanitary risk, 
the fishery sector is profoundly affected by the food 
safety standards imposed by advanced economies 
(e.g., the EU, the USA and Japan). In case of non-
compliance, the producer faces the risk of expulsion 
of the product from the market, rejection of exports 
at the border, destruction of shipments, and, in 
the worst case scenario, an outright export ban. 
Despite the risks and costs associated with the 
increasingly stringent standards, fishery exports 
from developing countries have increased in the 
past two decades. This trend is in line with the 
view that food standards may act as catalysts that 
stimulate vertical integration, capacity building and 
innovation, thus increasing the sector’s efficiency 
and competitiveness. 
The aggregate figures hide however a great degree 
of heterogeneity. For instance, the case of Benin’s 
shrimp export sector is a puzzling failure. Figure 
1 shows that, upon the 2003 export ban, shrimp 
exports from Benin to the EU completely collapsed 
and remained close to zero even after the ban was 
lifted in 2005. In this policy brief, we discuss three 
questions: Why have Benin’s shrimp exports not 
revived? What is the role of Aid for Trade? What is 
the impact of the export regime on the artisanal 
fishermen and their wives (the fishmongers)? 
Why has the sector not revived? Benin exported shrimp 
almost exclusively to EU markets. As a result, the ban 
put all three shrimp exporting firms in Benin out of 
business, which led to their current situation of high 
unsettled debt. In its turn, the dependency on the 
EU market is explained by the underdevelopment of 
the regional market, as well as the size of the sector, 
which is limited by the capacity of the lakes and poor 
regional infrastructure. The latter prevents the firms 
from cost-effectively sourcing from other lakes in the 
region, and exporting the additional supply to other 
advanced economies (e.g. the USA and Japan).1 
The small size of Benin’s shrimp sector also played a 
role in another way. Complying with food standards 
involves fixed costs (upgrading laboratories, building 
landing sites and control units, training fishery 
experts and fishermen, etc.), which, in the case of a 
small sector, are shared by few actors. The potential 
total net pay-off from upgrading a small sector is 
therefore relatively low. This may greatly reduce the 
incentives for both firms and governments to invest. 
Donors, for their part, incurred huge sunk costs in an 
effort to upgrade the sector, building infrastructure 
for controlling, treating and transporting the shrimp 
from the lakes to the firms, but the firms and the 
government were hesitant to take the further steps 
necessary to revive exports. 
Benin’s institutional environment has also played 
a crucial role. It is undisputed that, in addition 
to investments in “hard” transportation and 
communication infrastructure, the development of 
a “soft” infrastructure is at least as important for the 
integration of countries into value chains (Grossman 
and Helpman, 2005; Swinnen, Vandeplas, and 
Maertens, 2011). These may include well-functioning 
contractual institutions, but also social capital and 
informal ‘rules of the game’ which are crucially 
important for the functioning of a supply chain 
1  Exporting to non-EU advanced countries was also 
not an option during the ban, because the ban was self-imposed 
by Benin, and therefore covered all shrimp export markets, not 
only the EU. (The ban was self-imposed because not having 
done so would have increased the risk of an official EU ban on 
Benin’s fishery exports).
Benin’s shrimp sector collapsed following a ban on its exports to the EU. The ban was imposed in July 2003 and resulted 
from the non-compliance with EU food safety standards. Strikingly, the sector did not revive, despite the lift of the ban in 
2005 and considerable Aid for Trade flows. We argue that the sector’s dependency on the EU, Benin’s poor institutional 
environment, and inadequate Aid for Trade have played critical roles in explaining the persistent effects of the ban. 
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(Martinez and Poole, 2004). After all, all the actors 
in the chain are inter-dependent managers of the 
quality of the final product and the success of their 
combined management depends on the extent of 
the co-operation, information exchange and trust 
between them. 
These attributes are in short supply in Benin’s 
shrimp sector. For example, the fishing community 
is fractionalized between different ethnic groups 
and inter-group trust is very low (some fishermen 
blamed other ethnic groups for the ban). Also further 
down in the supply chain, mistrust plays a role: 
following allegations of misuse of a soft government 
loan by the firms, the Beninese government was 
hesitant to continue to support the firms and was 
waiting for the results of an investigation by the 
national debt committee. The banks were also 
reluctant to provide credit to the sector, given the 
firms’ debt, but also because they lack confidence 
in the capacity of the domestic actors (mainly the 
firms and government) to face up to the future 
financial and market challenges (without further 
extensive donor support). Besides, any changes 
in Benin’s shrimp supply chain also involve intra-
household bargaining, as fishermen sell to their 
wives, with whom they keep separate budgets. 
Overlooking this intra-household aspect may result 
in miscalculations about the impact of interventions 
in the sector. For instance, it may explain the 
failure of the policy to stimulate fishermen to sell 
directly to transfer platforms (where shrimp can be 
treated according to standards), because this policy 
effectively sidelines the fishermen’s wives, not only 
undermining their income source, but also altering 
Figure 1: Shrimp exports from Benin to the World and to the EU 
Sources: Data is taken from BACI database, which present the UN Comtrade database in a consistent way;  
see http://www.cepii.fr/CEPII/en/bdd_modele/presentation.asp?id=1, November 10, 2013
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their bargaining position in the household. 
Is there a future for Benin’s shrimp sector? Provided 
that the cold chain is respected by all the actors, the 
control units and transfer platforms operate, and 
the firms’ financial situation is sorted out, Benin 
possesses a very well-appreciated product that, 
in principle, satisfies the highest food and safety 
norms. However, the question remains whether, 
given its weak institutional environment, the 
country will be able to keep up with rapidly evolving 
EU food safety norms and be able to (re)conquer 
the market and compete with the expanding 
Asian shrimp exporters of standard quality but for 
a very low price. Benin could seek a niche in the 
international market and stress the quality of its 
shrimp. Aiming at a high-value product would also 
fit well with the small size of the sector as the price 
premium received would justify the higher unit 
costs of operation and compliance. Similarly, the 
sector could seek added value by aiming at labels 
for artisanal and/or environmentally sustainable 
fishing (private standards). However, the demanding 
administrative requirements and procedures to 
obtain special labels require skill and expertise that 
are far beyond the current capacity of actors in the 
sector. As such, one solution could be to open up 
the market to international firms and design these 
issues at the regional level, allowing to mobilize the 
required (financial and human) resources, and at 
the same time overcome Benin’s limited supply of 
shrimp. 
Can Aid for Trade resolve these constraints? Whereas 
more resource mobilization would be needed to 
effectively address the deficiencies that triggered 
the ban, international initiatives can by no means 
be a substitute for appropriate national actions 
and private sector involvement. A firm political 
commitment at a high level is crucial to coordinate 
donor efforts but also to obtain trust of private 
investors. 
But, what then is the role of Aid for Trade? While 
the Aid for Trade flows in the aftermath of the ban 
helped reducing the compliance gap, they failed to 
credibly upgrade the sector and facilitate private 
sector initiatives. Aid could have been more effective 
if (1) it had been more focused on capacity building 
of the local institutions involved so to assure the 
maintenance and operation of the donor-funded 
infrastructure, (2) if aid had been less fragmented, 
and more in line with private sector initiatives. To 
achieve this, a central coordinator, appointed by 
the aid receiving country could bring the private 
and public actors and the various interested 
donors around the table and discuss the actions 
required and their interdependencies. This central 
coordinator should take as a metric for success not 
only the export performance but also the welfare of 
the small-scale actors involved in the supply chain, 
because these small-scale actors are fragmented, 
ill-organized and ill-informed, and therefore lack 
agency.
How were artisanal fishermen and their wives (the 
fishmongers) affected by the ban, and what does their 
future look like? A household survey conducted in 
2009 points out that the stringent EU standards 
had a large and persistent negative impact on the 
income of these small-scale actors. The access to 
world markets, which translated into a perfectly 
elastic demand of exporting firms, assured daily 
market clearance for the fishermen. Being small, 
much poorer, and plagued by high transport and 
transaction costs, the domestic and regional 
markets could not take over this role. In addition, 
fishermen were constrained in their access to the 
non-fishery sector. As such, switching activities 
proved an effective coping strategy for only a handful 
of fishers and was insufficient to compensate for the 
loss in producer surplus. Instead, shrimp fishers 
engaged in competition with fish fishers, thereby 
compromising the future fishery stock.
While a revival of shrimp exports would therefore 
benefit small-scale actors, it would also raise two 
concerns. First, a revival of exports brings with it the 
risk of a renewed negative export shock, and thus 
the need to make households more resilient to such 
shocks by strengthening effective household coping 
strategies that are viable in the longer run and do 
not inflict negative externalities on the ecosystem 
or other households in the same community. In 
the case of the fishing communities, this means 
supporting income diversification outside the 
fishery sector, e.g. through micro-credit schemes 
and training programs that can increase the range 
of profitable activities that households can engage 
in. The second concern relates to the environmental 
impact of a change in the trade regime. Currently, 
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Benin’s artisanal fishery sector is plagued by 
overfishing and severe environmental degradation 
that threatens to permanently affect the lakes’ 
ecosystem. Partly as a response to the ban, partly as 
a reaction to the degradation of the lakes’ resources, 
fishers increased their fishing effort, by fishing 
during more hours a day and using more damaging 
fishing gears. Because the artisanal fishing activity 
is largely unregulated, it is unclear whether a revival 
of shrimp exports would curb the degradation trend. 
After all, if renewed export market access leads to 
an increase in the value of shrimp, fishing effort may 
increase instead of decrease. There is, therefore, 
an urgent need for effective institutions to regulate 
Benin’s fisheries and preserve the fishery stock for 
future generations. At present, such institutions are 
lacking and the pressure on the lake is mounting.
In sum, to revive a lucrative export sector and 
guarantee sustainable livelihoods, there is an 
urgent need for an integrated approach, that brings 
together public and private sector initiatives, small 
and large-scale actors, and short and long-term 
perspectives. 
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 z The export ban and its impact are discussed at length in the paper “The unintended 
consequence of an export ban: Evidence from Benin’s shrimp sector”, which is available as 
an IOB working paper 2013-11  
https://www.uantwerp.be/en/faculties/iob/publications/working-papers/ 
 z Two related studies titled “To fish or not to fish? Resource degradation and income 
diversification in Benin”, and “Voodoo versus fishing committees: the role of traditional 
and modern community institutions in fisheries management” are available as LICOS 
discussion papers: 
http://www.econ.kuleuven.be/licos/publications/discussion-papers
